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Abstract 
The 1997 Asian crisis is described in order to show a plausible chain of causes and 
events that led to the eventual collapse of many Asian currencies. Empirical evidence is 
presented based upon the experiences of five Southeast Asian countries that were 
severely affected by the crisis. Policies are recommended in the setting of exchange 
rates, the monitoring and liberalisation of banks, the foreign ownership of domestic 
assets and the augmentation of foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Introduction 
The crisis in Asia has been tormenting the minds of economists since it started in the 
middle of 1997. Its defining characteristic was the wholesale collapse in as little as a 
few weeks of the Thai baht, the Malaysian ringgit, the Indonesian rupiah, the Philippine 
peso and other currencies in Southeast Asia. Numerous anecdotes suggest that 
domestic political corruption, perhaps through imprudent lending policies, was an 
important explanation for why the crisis occurred. For example, Krugman (1998) sees 
in the political connections of "minister's nephews" the motivating force behind the 
recklessness of the many failed investment projects that have occurred during the 
crisis. But political corruption has been in the region for as long as anyone can 
remember, yet never before has there been such a massive and rapid currency 
depreciation. While corruption may have contributed to the crisis, it can be regarded as 
only one among a complex host of responsible factors.  
This article presents a description of those factors that are believed to have caused the 
crisis in Asia. Some empirical evidence in support of the description is presented by way 
of recent data concerning five Asian countries: South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. Policies are recommended concerning the determination of 
exchange rates, the supervision and liberalisation of banks, the foreign ownership of 
domestic assets and the appropriate level of foreign-exchange reserves. 
 
Plausible Causes 
A cursory understanding of the crisis reveals many plausible causes (see, for example, 
Victorio, 1998). One of the most important may have been the policy of inflexible 
currency exchange rates implemented by the affected countries: Thailand, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia and South Korea. Another was the 
large inflow into these countries of short-term foreign funds that were mismatched to 
long-term investments, making the economy vulnerable to withdrawals. Quite 
separately and still another was an increase in progressively less-sustainable domestic 
investments. Finally, there were the regional shocks in currency and trade: the 
competitive devaluations by China, the weakening of world demand for some 
regionally-produced electronic products and the weakening of the Japanese yen.  
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How these factors interacted to cause the crisis is fodder for modellers in years to 
come. A tentative description of their plausible interaction is presented in Figure 1. Its 
main elements are explained as follows.  
Providing early impetus were the trade shocks and the inflexible structure of exchange-
rate policies. Exerting their influence from the early 1990s, these factors caused many 
of the Asian currencies to become overvalued and, therefore, susceptible to a corrective 
devaluation. The overvaluation did not seem to raise any concerns among the 
international community, for their foreign capital continued to flow into the affected 
countries in unprecedented large amounts. The currency overvaluation and the inflows 
helped to support ubiquitous current-account deficits. Additionally, they became a 
source for the rapid expansion of bank loans and domestic investments – some perhaps 
tainted by political corruption – and thus the high GDP growths that lulled the 
international community into the 1990s' exuberance over the Asian miracle.  
The increases in bank loans and domestic investment were also the result of banking 
behaviour, particularly in Thailand, the country that deregulated last, in 1990. But 
many investors did not appear to know that many of the increases were being funnelled 
into the purchase of fixed assets rather than into, say, the production of tradeable 
goods. This made the high GDP growths unsustainable and precariously dependable 
upon continued confidence in a favourable return to the fixed assets. When enough 
people believed that the GDP growths were not sustainable – and all that was required 
may have been a few foreign banks questioning whether to roll over credit for one 
country – domestic asset prices fell, capital inflows were reversed and fixed exchange 
rate policies had to be abandoned because of deteriorating foreign reserves. The belief 
quickly spread to other countries, thereby adding contagion to the list of what caused 
the crisis. 
 
The Consequences of Inflexible Exchange Rates 
The evidence for such a description is only beginning to emerge, and is mainly in the 
form of macroeconomic indicators during the 1990s. Not yet included and worthy of 
further study is a systematic statistical analysis of the associations between the 
variables. Most of the evidence is presented in Table 1, in the form of data concerning 
exchange rates, currency values, current-account deficits, bank loans, property prices 
and sources of external financing.  
By way of background, inflexible exchange-rate policies were ubiquitous to the 
countries that were affected. Every policy consisted of some variation around pegging 
the local currency to the US dollar. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines did not allow 
their currencies to fluctuate beyond a narrow band, the widest of which was 15% of a 
nominal exchange rate. South Korea and Indonesia were more flexible, intermittently 
allowing fluctuations that nominally depreciated their respective currencies by 26% 
over a six-year period beginning in 1990.  
When the dollar sharply strengthened relative to the yen and the European currencies 
in the middle of 1995, it lifted with it virtually all of the Asian currencies. By 1996 most 
of those currencies had appreciated dramatically in real terms. From the figures in 
Table 1, the average appreciation was about 11% from 1990 based upon the 
Indonesian rupiah, the Malaysian ringgit, the Philippine peso and the Thai baht. Only 
the Korean won depreciated. 
By encouraging imports and diminishing the competitiveness of exports, the 
appreciation of the currencies contributed to generating the current-account deficits 
that were symptomatic of an impending devaluation. Whether the deficits were 
sustainable would have been difficult to judge. Looking at real GDP alone might have 
painted a rosy picture. As shown in the table, each of the countries, with the exception 
of the Philippines, experienced a high average annual rate of growth exceeding 7% of 
its real GDP. Analysing that these current-account deficits were large, as a proportion 
of GDP, would have been more discerning because it would have indicated whether the 
debt resulting from the deficits could be repaid. While there is no general consensus 
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concerning what proportions are sustainable (see, for example, Ferretti et al, 1996), 
one obvious criterion is that the real interest rate on the foreign debt owed from the 
deficits must not exceed the growth rate of the GDP. An operational equivalent of this is 
recommended by Summers (1996) who suggests that concerns ought to be raised 
whenever the deficits exceed 5% of GDP. Based upon the table, such a critical limit 
would have been failed by Malaysia and Thailand, and only marginally satisfied by the 
Philippines. 
 
Policy Recommendation I: Make Exchange Rates Flexible 
The undesirable consequences of the inflexible policies imply a strong policy argument 
for making exchange rates more flexible. Why rates ought to be rigid is sometimes 
based upon the perception that fixing rates can be used to improve domestic 
macroeconomic outcomes. For example, a fixed exchange rate can have the effect of 
decreasing the natural volatility of currency fluctuations, thereby decreasing the risk 
premiums charged by foreign lenders and cheapening the cost of borrowing funds from 
abroad.  
But further economic theory leads one to be naturally skeptical of such a view. 
Currency depreciations seem inevitable, and one of the lessons of the crisis seems to 
be that monetary authorities have very little power over setting exchange rates. The 
theory indicates that if an impending currency depreciation is to be prevented, say 
because of a currency attack borne out of unfavourable expectations, the monetary 
authority can launch a non-sterilised intervention: that of reducing the domestic money 
supply in order to raise domestic interest rates to a level that makes domestic assets 
attractive to hold by comparison with their foreign counterparts. The intervention may 
attract foreign capital sufficiently enough to strengthen the domestic currency but it can 
only be conducted by selling foreign-exchange reserves. When reserves are depleted 
the currency can no longer be defended. The other, sterilised intervention – that of 
restoring money supply to its previous level in order to prevent domestic interest rates 
from rising – prevents domestic assets from becoming comparatively profitable to hold, 
thereby creating another round of pressure for the currency to depreciate and for 
reserves to be used to defend the currency.  
Allowing exchange rates to become more flexible may also have the counter-intuitive 
effect of discouraging foreign speculation. Speculative currency attacks are often 
conditioned upon the perception that foreign exchange reserves are limited and that 
fixed exchange rate policies will eventually have to be abandoned. For this reason, 
foreign exchange controls have the unintended effect of effectively subsidising 
speculative activity.  
 
Domestic Banking and Real Estate 
The evidence concerning banking points to a lack of caution on the part of lenders 
concerning the prudent allocation of loans. It is partly in the context of this evidence 
that a case could be made for political corruption having been an contributing factor to 
the crisis. As shown in Table 1, domestic loans grew rapidly. In the years between 1990 
and 1996, all of the countries experienced an uninterrupted period of rapid growth in 
their respective domestic banks' lending to the private sector. Even the lowest of the 
recorded annual growths, used to calculate the averages shown in the table, exceeded 
any of the countries' recorded GDP growth: 11% for that of Malaysia in 1992. This 
rapid growth led to substantial increases in all of the countries' ratios of domestic bank 
lending to GDP.  
However, with respect to where the loans were going, there ought to have been more 
caution. On the one hand, it did not appear that the loans were feeding domestic 
consumption as much as they were feeding domestic investment. Domestic 
investments were consistently a large proportion of GDP – over a third of GDP – for all 
countries except the Philippines. On the other hand, the loans appeared to be feeding 
investments in fixed assets rather than tradeables (see also Corsetti et al, 1998). As 
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shown, a large proportion of domestic bank assets was in the form of property and real 
estate loans: an estimated average of 27% as of 1997. There may well have been a 
connection between this proportion and the high proportion of loans that were 
eventually recorded in 1997 as non-performing, between 14% and 19%. Furthermore, 
during the 1990s, all of the countries experienced a boom in their respective stock and 
real estate markets. For Indonesia and the Philippines, residential real estate prices 
rose phenomenally over relatively short periods. Because loans were going into fixed 
assets rather than tradeables, the viability of the loans could only be sustained if asset 
prices continued to rise. 
 
Policy Recommendation II: Increase Bank Supervision 
Because of the above evidence, bank activities ought to be supervised more closely, 
and findings from the supervision should be widely disseminated. For example, a case 
could be made for requiring banks to demonstrate capital adequacies in excess of the 
minimum of 8% of reserves suggested by the Bank of International Settlements for 
industrialised economies. As another example, strong warnings ought to be issued 
whenever stock and real estate prices appreciate more rapidly than normal, for these 
may signal that bank loans are becoming predicated upon fragile and unsustainable 
asset values.  
One justification for this recommendation that augurs well with the evidence is the 
theory that, without the warnings, investors can suffer a kind of optical illusion 
concerning growth (Sachs, 1997). The illusion renders investors inattentive, for they 
erroneously interpret asset-price increases as evidence of a boom in tradeable goods. 
The greater supervision of banks is bound to be unpopular not only because it appears 
anti-laissez faire, but also because it may seem to impede upon the financial 
development that is required for continued economic growth. However, the contracts 
that characterise banking are not as free of potentially adverse incentives as those 
which characterise other goods and services (Stiglitz, 1994). For one, financial 
contracts are less enforceable and more information-constrained than most other goods 
and services. For another, public authorities are usually obliged to guarantee the 
repayment of loans whenever the viability of the banking system is threatened. These 
two encourage non-repayment and moral hazard (defined in this case as the immoral 
undertaking of hazardous bank-financed projects), which seems to be corroborated by 
the evidence. 
 
Policy Recommendation III: Guard Against Rapid Financial Liberalisation 
Yet another banking recommendation is for public authorities to address some pitfalls 
from rapid financial liberalisation. One pitfall is the usually increased risk of a banking 
crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1996) present evidence that financial liberalisation is 
an important contributor to banking crises, and that banking crises appear to 
precipitate balance-of-payment crises. In their analysis of 46 balance-of-payments 
incidents between 1980 and 1995, nearly half appeared to have been associated with 
banking crises that were preceded by private lending booms.  
The increased risk might be a natural consequence of opening the country's capital 
account to the rest of the world. The usual inflexibility of exchange rates, and the 
obligation of public authorities to stand by their banks are often adequate to secure for 
foreign lenders an implicit insurance against any losses from either foreign exchange 
fluctuations or domestic loan defaults. It is therefore not surprising that for the Asian 
crisis, capital inflows and domestic lending both exploded at nearly the same time that 
real estate prices and non-performing loans grew. Another reason for the increased risk 
is one proposed by Montes (1997): that excessively rapid financial liberalisation can 
prevent banks from developing acceptable competence in judging credit-worthiness. He 
describes the experience of Thailand as detrimental to the development of sound 
banking practices because the country's banks have become accustomed to the lazy 
practice of lending only to the government or to blue-chip companies. 
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Another pitfall to rapid liberalisation is the unintentional encouragement of capital 
outflows which results when other parts of the economy are not liberalised. In this 
regard, the experience of Thailand also presents some lessons. It liberalised its banking 
system by decreasing bank monitoring and removing the restrictions it had earlier 
placed upon domestic interest rates and foreign-exchange trade. These policies 
promoted competition and success among banks in the bidding for foreign funds, and 
could well have explained a great proportion of that country's share of the large capital 
inflows into Asia throughout 1996 (see Table 1). However, the country did not liberalise 
the myriad of investment-incentive subsidies that were in place for foreign investors 
(see, for example, Williamson, 1993). When the restrictions on foreign exchange trade 
were removed, the effort would have had the effect of subsidising capital outflows, for 
retaining subsidies on capital inflows while removing foreign-exchange restrictions is 
tantamount to subsidising capital outflows. Thus, it can be argued that incomplete 
financial liberalisation may have added to making Thailand vulnerable to a greater 
volatility in capital flows and, therefore, to the currency crisis of 1997. 
 
Policy Recommendation IV: Remove Impediments to Foreign Ownership 
For sources of external financing among the affected countries, the evidence points to 
the preponderance of capital inflows, rather than more irreversible foreign direct 
investments (FDIs). The table describes the growth of private capital inflows for the five 
countries between 1994 and 1996, before their rapid reversal in 1997. By comparison 
to private capital inflows, FDIs were quite small.  
One plausible reason for the heavy reliance upon capital inflows is the many legal and 
ethnocentric impediments that public authorities placed upon the foreign ownership of 
domestic assets. For example, in the Philippines, foreign individuals or corporations are 
legally prohibited from either owning land, or greater than 49% of the equity of a local 
business. To this end, impediments to foreign ownership should be reexamined or 
eliminated. Because they encourage capital inflows rather than FDIs, the country's 
foreign financing becomes more susceptible to changes in market sentiment. 
Additionally, they limit foreign-investor knowledge and control over the domestic 
allocation of foreign funds, thereby encouraging the moral hazard in domestic decisions 
that seemed pervasive.  
 
Policy Recommendation V: Augment Foreign Exchange Reserves 
The evidence also shows the strong influence that capital inflows exerted upon foreign 
exchange reserves. Between 1990 and 1996, foreign reserves grew by an average of 
276% for all of the countries at a time when there were pressures upon reserves to 
shrink because of the current account deficits. Increases in FDIs could not fully account 
for the growth in reserves; according to the table, it was only in Malaysia wherein the 
proportion of inward FDIs to current account deficits was greater than 100%. In the 
rest of the countries, the proportion was no larger than 61%.  
The implication from this evidence is that foreign exchange reserves, no matter how 
much they increase, are inadequate if they are not large enough to meet foreign 
liabilities. Countries should therefore be encouraged to build their reserves to some 
proportion that is acceptable. As a minimum, reserves ought to be as large as short-
term foreign liabilities. As of 1996, only Malaysia and the Philippines would have met 
such a standard; South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand would all have failed. Indeed, 
the table shows how the size of the short-term maturities exceeded, on the average, 
the countries' foreign reserves: the ratio of the former to the latter was 137%. Thus, 
the reserves could not have comfortably financed the sudden reversal of the capital 
inflows that occurred in 1997, and the investors would have acted according to the 
belief that the reserves were indeed not large enough to make reversals unnecessary. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Under the circumstances, none of the above recommendations can be anything but 
tentative. While they uncover some basic lessons for policy-makers, their 
generalisability to other countries, and even among the five countries themselves, is 
debatable. The description and the evidence ignore any country-specific factors that 
can account for the differences in experiences (see, for example, De Dios et al for those 
factors in the Philippines). As a result, they underestimate the economic flexibility of 
those countries that seem to have weathered the crisis well and, likewise, overestimate 
the strength of those that have been hit hard. Even so, the weight of the evidence 
seems to tilt toward a paradigmatic explanation that is eclectic but universal, especially 
when one’s intuitions about the complexity of the crisis are thrown into the balance. 
 
This Working Paper is accompanied by two charts Figure 1. A Description of the 
1997 Asian Crisis and Table 1. The 1997 Asian Crisis:Indicators for Five Asian 
Countries which are available from the Asian Studies Institute on request.  
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